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Abstract—This paper concerns the problem of detecting the
use of information hiding at anti-copying 2D barcodes. Prior
hidden information detection schemes are either heuristic-based
or Machine Learning (ML) based. The key limitation of prior
heuristics-based schemes is that they do not answer the fun-
damental question of why the information hidden at a 2D
barcode can be detected. The key limitation of prior ML-based
information schemes is that they lack robustness because a
printed 2D barcode is very much environmentally dependent,
and thus an information hiding detection scheme trained in one
environment often does not work well in another environment. In
this paper, we propose two hidden information detection schemes
at the existing anti-copying 2D barcodes. The first scheme is to
directly use the pixel distance to detect the use of an information
hiding scheme in a 2D barcode, referred as to the Pixel Distance
Based Detection (PDBD) scheme. The second scheme is first
to calculate the variance of the raw signal and the covariance
between the recovered signal and the raw signal, and then based
on the variance results, detects the use of information hiding
scheme in a 2D barcode, referred as to the Pixel Variance Based
Detection (PVBD) scheme. Moreover, we design advanced IC
attacks to evaluate the security of two existing anti-copying 2D
barcodes. We implemented our schemes and conducted extensive
performance comparison between our schemes and prior schemes
under different capturing devices, such as a scanner and a camera
phone. Our experimental results show that the PVBD scheme
can correctly detect the existence of the hidden information at
both the 2LQR code and the LCAC 2D barcode. Moreover, the
probability of successfully attacking of our IC attacks achieves
0.6538 for the 2LQR code and 1 for the LCAC 2D barcode.
Index Terms—Information hiding, anti-copying 2D barcode,
detection, illegitimately copying attack, embedded locations.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
The Illegitimately-Copying (IC) attacks seriously hinder the
application of Two-Dimensional (2D) barcodes as an anti-
counterfeiting technique since a 2D barcode can be easily
replicated with an off-the-shelf photocopier. The IC attacks
introduce large economic and reputational loss for an au-
thorized manufacturer. Some anti-copying 2D barcodes have
been proposed to overcome the security risk of IC attacks
but accompanying with some limitations, e.g., special printing
materials or techniques, and physical unclonable function.
They have two limitations: high production cost and low
universal applicability. Recently, some new anti-copying 2D
barcodes were proposed utilizing the additional distortion
on the received 2D barcode introduced by IC attacks to
effectively overcome the above limitations, such as Two-Level
QR (2LQR) [1] code and Low-Cost Anti-Copying (LCAC) [2]
2D barcode. Specifically, the 2LQR code [1] and the LCAC 2D
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barcode [2] embed subtle patterns and authentication message
into the 2D barcode, respectively, to realize the anti-copying
purpose.
This paper concerns the problem of detecting the use of
information hiding at anti-copying 2D barcodes. Such informa-
tion hiding detection schemes have the following applications.
First, it can be used to evaluate the security level of the existing
anti-copying 2D barcodes. For example, if the existence of the
hidden information in a printed 2D barcode can be detected
by an attacker, advanced IC attacks can be launched by the
attacker. Second, it can be used to detect illegal information
that is hidden in a normal 2D barcode, e.g., Trojan virus or
phishing websites. Third, it can be used by military and law
enforcement agencies to detect the leakage of confidential or
even classified information. Thus, the objective of this paper is
to detect the existence of the hidden information in a printed
2D barcode and further to design advanced IC attacks to
evaluate the security level of the existing anti-copying 2D
barcodes.
B. System Model
In our system model, there are one sender and one receiver,
where the sender prints a 2D barcode and sends it to the
receiver two possible channels: a legal channel and an illegal
channel. The legal channel describes the Single Print and
Capture (SPC) process whereas the illegal channel describes
the Double Print and Capture (DPC) process. The sender
may or may not embed hidden information in the original
message of a 2D barcode using the existing anti-copying 2D
barcodes. If the 2D barcode is indeed embedded with hidden
information, the sender and the receiver often share a secret
so that the sender can hide information with this secret and
the receiver can decode the hidden information with the same
secret. We assume that our hidden information detector, which
we call a monitor, captures the 2D barcode printed by the
sender since a 2D barcode can be easily replicated with an
off-the-shelf photocopier. We assume that the monitor does
not know a prior whether the 2D barcode carries hidden
information or not, and if they do, we assume that the monitor
does not know the shared secret between the sender and the
receiver.
C. Limitations of Prior Art
Prior hidden information detection schemes are either
heuristic-based or Machine Learning (ML) based [3]. The
key limitation of prior heuristics-based schemes is that they
do not answer the fundamental question of why the infor-
mation hidden at a 2D barcode can be detected. The key
limitation of prior ML-based information schemes is that they
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2lack robustness because a printed 2D barcode is very much
environmentally dependent, and thus an information hiding
detection scheme trained in one environment often does not
work well in another environment.
D. Proposed Approach
Our approach is based on the insight that embedding hidden
information into a 2D barcode will inevitably have a negative
impact on the decodability of the original message of a 2D
barcode, such as the increase of the error probability at the
receiver (as well as the monitor). If the total errors introduced
by the channel noise and the embedding operation exceeds
the error-correcting capability of the original message of a
2D barcode at the receiver under an SPC process, then the
presence of the hidden information becomes obvious and such
anti-copying 2D barcode should not be applied in practice.
If the total errors introduced by the channel noise and the
embedding operation does not exceed the error-correcting ca-
pability of the original message of a 2D barcode at the receiver,
then the monitor can recover the original message. Based on
the above insight, in our approach, after the monitor recovers
the original message, it will re-encode and re-modulate the
original message, and then compare the resulting signals,
which we call recovered signals, with the raw signals that it
received from the sender. The key technical challenge is how
to compare the recovered signals with the raw received signals
so that we can detect the presence of the hidden information.
To address this challenge, we first propose our information
detection approach at anti-copying 2D barcodes by comparing
the recovered signals with the raw received signals. Second,
we derive a rigorous theoretical analysis of the test statistics of
our approach for different hypotheses, such as the probability
of a false alarm (PFA) and the probability of detection (PD).
Based on the theoretical analysis, we can calculate the optimal
decision threshold using the Neyman-Pearson (NP) theorem
by maximizing PD while ensuring that PFA does not exceed a
threshold. Furthermore, we can measure the impact of existing
anti-copying 2D barcodes or capturing devices, e.g., scanner
or camera phone, on the detectability of our approach.
E. Advantages over Prior Art
We advance the state-of-the-art on detecting the information
hidden at the existing anti-copying 2D barcodes from two
fronts. First, in comparison with prior heuristic-based schemes,
our approach answers the fundamental question of why the
information hidden at the existing anti-copying 2D barcodes
can be detected. Second, in comparison with prior ML-based
schemes, our approach is much more robust because our
approach is environmentally independent.
F. Technical Challenges and Our Solution
The first technical challenge is to construct a reasonable test
statistic, as it directly determines the final detection perfor-
mance of our approach. To address this challenge, we propose
two hidden information detection schemes at the existing anti-
copying 2D barcodes. The first scheme is to directly use
the pixel distance to detect the use of an information hiding
scheme in a 2D barcode, referred as to the Pixel Distance
Based Detection (PDBD) scheme. The second scheme is first
to calculate the variance of the raw signal and the covariance
between the recovered signal and the raw signal, and then
based on the variance results, detects the use of information
hiding scheme in a 2D barcode, referred as to the Pixel Vari-
ance Based Detection (PVBD) scheme. The PVBD scheme
has a better detection performance than the PDBD scheme
because it magnifies the difference between the 2D barcode
carrying no hidden information and the 2D barcode carrying
hidden information. In comparison, the PDBD scheme has
two key advantages over the PVBD scheme. First, the PDBD
scheme runs faster than the PVBD scheme. Second, the PDBD
scheme can pinpoint the exact locations on the received 2D
barcode that are embedded with hidden information, whereas
the PVBD scheme cannot.
The second technical challenge is to find the optimal test
threshold for our detection schemes because either an SPC pro-
cess or a DPC process is challenging to accurately be modeled
and an inappropriate threshold inevitably introduces large false
alarms or missed detections. To address this challenge, we first
present a simplified theoretical model for the test statistic of
two proposed detection schemes using a generalized Gaussian
distribution (GGD). Then, based on the simplified theoretical,
we obtain the optimal test thresholds of our detection schemes.
The third technical challenge is to effectively evaluate the
security level of the existing anti-copying 2D barcodes because
there are some limitations in the existing IC attacks. For
example, a synthetic IC attack requires multiple versions of
a legitimate 2D barcode. If a 2D barcode generated by the
merchant is unique, a monitor cannot launch an effective IC
attack. For another example, an ML-based IC attack requires
sufficiently many trained samples to obtain a good attacking
model, especially it is extremely challenging for a monitor
to obtain the electronic version of a 2D barcode containing
hidden information. To address this challenge, we design
advanced IC attacks to evaluate the security of two existing
anti-copying 2D barcodes: the 2LQR code and the LCAC 2D
barcode.
1) In the 2LQR code, the legitimate sender and receiver
should share a pattern database in whole or in part for
making an authentication decision. Thus, we propose
two advanced IC attacks for the 2LQR code under two
scenarios: Public Pattern Database (PPD) and Unknown
Pattern Database (UPD). Under the PPD scenario, the
goal of our IC attack is to first find the chosen patterns
from the public pattern database and then based on the
chosen patterns to launch an effective IC attack. Under
the UPD scenario, our IC attack first estimates the size
of a received pattern and then constructs an alternative
pattern database through a binarization technique. At
last, our IC attack finds the chosen patterns from the
alternative pattern database and then based on the chosen
patterns to launch an effective IC attack.
2) For the LCAC 2D barcode, based on the PDBD scheme,
our IC attack should pinpoint the exact locations on
the received 2D barcode that are embedded with hidden
3information. Thus, we propose two advanced IC attacks
for the LCAC 2D barcode under two cases: All Constel-
lation Points (ACP) and Separate Constellation Points
(SCP). In the ACP case, the detection of embedded
locations is designed on all constellation points, where
we treat all constellation points equally. In the SCP
case, the detection of embedded locations is separately
designed on different constellation points, where we
treat different constellation points individually.
G. Key Contributions and Results
In this paper, we make three key contributions. First, we
propose two hidden information detection schemes at the ex-
isting anti-copying 2D barcodes. We explicitly analyze the PD
and PFA of our schemes, derive their closed-form expressions,
and obtain their optimal test thresholds. Second, we design
advanced IC attacks to evaluate the security of two existing
anti-copying 2D barcodes: the 2LQR code and the LCAC 2D
barcode. In particular, our IC attacks can deal with the scenario
of an unknown pattern database in the 2LQR code and can
correctly pinpoint the embedded locations in the LCAC 2D
barcode. Three, we implemented our schemes and conducted
extensive performance comparison between our schemes and
prior schemes under different capturing devices, such as a
scanner and a camera phone. Our experimental results show
that the PVBD scheme can correctly detect the existence of the
hidden information at both the 2LQR code and the LCAC 2D
barcode. Moreover, the probability of successfully attacking
of our IC attacks achieves 0.6538 for the 2LQR code and 1
for the LCAC 2D barcode.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Anti-Copying 2D barcodes
1) Special Printing Materials or Techniques: These ap-
proaches exploit the special features of printing materials or
printing techniques to defend against the IC attacks since the
special features cannot be reproduced on purpose. Adams et
al. used specific printers to print a 2D barcode for defending
against IC attacks [4], [5]. Marguerettaz et al. used a polymer-
ized liquid crystal material with unique optical characteristics
to print an anti-copying 2D barcode [6]. Wang et al. used a
special halftone printing technology to print an anti-copying
2D barcode that is invisible under visible light [7].
2) Physical Unclonable Function (PUF): In the PUF, a
stimulus is an input to a physical entity and we use the
output as unique features. The PUF is an unclonable response
function since these features are determined by the internal
physical structure, e.g., the certain unique texture of printing
paper [8], [9]. Recently, some researchers constructed the PUF
for mobile imaging devices under a semi-controlled condition
to extract microscopic textural features [10]–[12].
However, there are two limitations to the first two ap-
proaches: high production cost and low universal applicabil-
ity, which hinders their promotion in extensive applications.
Actually, every P&C process inevitably introduces additional
distortion on the received 2D barcode, which is an intrinsic
channel feature of IC attacks. Thus, the channel feature can
be used to defend against IC attacks [13]–[15]. Recently, based
on the channel feature, some researchers proposed new low-
cost 2D barcodes to effectively overcome the limitations of the
first two approaches, which are briefly introduced as follows.
3) Two-Level QR (2LQR) Code: Tkachenko et al. proposed
the 2LQR code by replacing all black modules of a standard
QR code with some black-and-white subtle patterns [1]. These
subtle patterns have two requirements: unknown to the third
party and sensitive to a P&C process. The 2LQR code has the
following limitations. First, the 2LQR code introduces visually
perceptual modification. Second, the 2LQR code requires a
higher positioning accuracy of the capturing equipment or a
higher proportion of the training sequence. Thus, it is difficult
to apply the 2LQR code to the scenario that the camera of a
mobile phone works as the capture device of the legitimate
receiver. Third, the 2LQR code was designed for 2D barcodes
with two-order modulation, which cannot straightforwardly be
extended to 2D barcodes with higher-order modulation.
4) Low-Cost Anti-Copying (LCAC) 2D barcode: Xie et al.
proposed the LCAC 2D barcode by exploiting the difference
between the noise characteristics of legitimate and illegitimate
channels [2]. Specifically, the sender of the LCAC 2D barcode
embeds an authentication message into the original message
to realize the anti-copying purpose. The LCAC 2D barcode
effectively overcomes the aforementioned limitations of the
2LQR code.
B. Existing IC Attacks
1) Direct IC Attack: A monitor first captures a legitimate
2D barcode. Then, the monitor directly prints it to spoof the
legitimate receiver.
2) Synthetic IC Attack: A monitor first collects multiple
versions of a legitimate 2D barcode. Second, the monitor
makes a preprocessing to launch an IC attack, e.g., a smooth-
ing operation. At last, the monitor prints the output of the
preprocessing to spoof the legitimate receiver. The basic idea
of a synthetic IC attack is to suppress the distortion caused by
a P&C process through the preprocessing.
3) Machine Learning (ML) Based IC Attack: Yadav et al.
proposed an efficient IC attack by using a supervised ML
approach to launch an IC attack [3]. This ML-based IC attack
is realized through a neural network that consists of three parts:
5 layers of encoders, 5 layers of decoders, and one hidden
layer that provides a useful compressed representation of the
input [16]. First, a monitor collects sufficiently large numbers
of legitimate 2D barcodes and their corresponding electronic
versions for training the neural network to obtain an attacking
model. Second, the monitor uses the attacking model to obtain
the electronic version of an illegitimate 2D barcode. At last,
the monitor prints the output of the neural network to spoof the
legitimate receiver. The basic idea of an ML-based IC attack
is to reconstruct the electronic version of a new 2D barcode
containing hidden information.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. System Model
We illustrate the system model of a 2D barcode with two
possible channels in Fig. 1, where the lower branch represents
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Fig. 1. System model of a 2D barcode with two possible channels, i.e., a
legitimate channel and an illegitimate channel.
a legitimate channel (an SPC process) and the dashed box
represents an illegitimate channel (a DPC process). Intuitively,
the distortion and noise in a DPC process are more severe than
those in an SPC process. Specifically, we model the total noise
in a legitimate channel as
e1 = ep1 ⊕ ec1, (1)
where ep1 and ec1 represent the noise components of the first
printing process and the legitimate capture process, respec-
tively, and ’⊕’ represents the interaction of noise in different
stages. Then, we model the total noise in an illegitimate
channel as
e2 = ep1 ⊕ ec1 ⊕ ep2 ⊕ ec2, (2)
where ec2 and ep2 represent the noise components of the
illegitimate capture process and the second printing process,
respectively. Based on the results of [2], [17], we can easily
conclude that the variance of e2 is significantly larger than
that of e1.
In the sender, an original message is generated, denoted as
Io. In the meantime, hidden information is generated, denoted
as Ih, e.g., subtle patterns for the 2LQR code [1] or an
authentication message for the LCAC 2D barcode [2]. Note
that the hidden information can be simultaneously generated at
both the sender and the receiver according to the shared secret
K, which is unknown to the third party. Then, we embed the
hidden information into the original message to obtain the
electronic version of a legitimate 2D barcode with Q-order
modulation, denoted as I . Specifically, in the 2LQR code, all
black modules of Io are replaced by the subtle patterns defined
in Ih; in the LCAC 2D barcode, certain bits of the source
message in Io are replaced by those of the authentication
message defined in Ih.
Then, the sender prints I and a receiver captures the printed
2D barcode. In other words, through a P&C process, the
receiver obtains a degraded version of I , denoted as R.
Through an equalizer to compensate for the channel distortion,
the receiver obtains an equalization output Yˆx(x = 1, 2). Here,
x = 1 represents an SPC process that Yˆ1 is legitimate, whereas
x = 2 represents a DPC process that Yˆ2 is illegitimate.
For defending against IC attacks, the receiver performs
an authentication test by comparing Ih with Yˆx. From the
mathematical point of view, we formulate the authentication
test as a threshold test with hypotheses, given as follows.
H0 : d(Ih; Yˆx) ≤ θb
H1 : d(Ih; Yˆx) > θb, (3)
where H0 represents an SPC process that the received 2D
barcode is legitimate and H1 represents the opposite case.
Here, d (x; y) is a comparison function that first extracts the
features from x and y, respectively, and then compares the two
features to obtain a test statistic. Specifically, in the 2LQR
code, d
(
I; Yˆx
)
is defined as a Pearson correlation between
the patterns of Ih with the corresponding patterns of Yˆx [1];
in the LCAC 2D barcode, d
(
I; Yˆx
)
is defined as the Bit
Error Ratio (BER) between the authentication message in Ih
and that in Yˆx [2]. Here, θb is a decision threshold that is
determined according to the NP theorem. Specifically, the
optimal threshold is determined by making the PFA less than
a predetermined upper bound, where the PFA is defined as
accepting H1 when H0 is true.
B. Problem Statements
Besides the receiver, a monitor also can capture the 2D
barcode printed by the sender since a 2D barcode can be easily
replicated with an off-the-shelf photocopier. If the existence of
the hidden information in a printed 2D barcode can be detected
by other parties, e.g., a monitor or an attacker, the security
of the existing anti-copying 2D barcodes is challenged, e.g.,
advanced IC attacks can be launched by the monitor. Thus, we
will propose two hidden information detection schemes at the
existing anti-copying 2D barcodes in Section IV. Moreover,
there are some limitations in the existing IC attacks described
in Section II.
1) Direct IC Attack: Although this attack is the simplest,
its attacking performance is poor.
2) Synthetic IC Attack: Although a synthetic IC attack has
better-attacking performance than a direct IC attack, it has a
stronger assumption, i.e., multiple versions of a legitimate 2D
barcode. If a 2D barcode generated by the merchant is unique,
a monitor cannot launch a synthetic IC attack.
3) ML-Based IC Attack: Although an ML-based IC attack
can achieve better-attacking performance than the other IC
attacks, there are some limitations in [3]. First, it requires suffi-
ciently many trained samples to obtain a good attacking model,
especially it is extremely challenging for a monitor to obtain
the electronic version of a 2D barcode containing hidden
information. Second, for different anti-copying 2D barcodes,
an ML-based IC attack should re-train a new attacking model.
Third, the approach in [3] was designed for 2D barcodes
with two-order modulation, which cannot straightforwardly be
extended to 2D barcodes with higher-order modulation
IV. TWO HIDDEN INFORMATION DETECTION SCHEMES AT
ANTI-COPYING 2D BARCODES
A. Description of Our Approach
The block diagram of our approach in the monitor is illus-
trated in Fig. 2. After obtained a printed 2D barcode R through
an SPC process, the monitor first equalizes to compensate
the channel distortion for a 2D barcode with higher-order
modulation (Q > 2) by using the training symbols described
in [2], [17]. Specifically, the equalizer block trains a fitting
function to reflect the channel distortion by comparing the
gray-scale values of the scanned training symbols with those
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Fig. 2. Block diagram of our approach in the monitor.
of the considered ones. When the fitting function is trained,
an inverse fitting function is further established to correct the
channel distortion. Through the equalizer block, the monitor
obtains an equalization output Yˆ1. Then, through demodu-
lation, decoder, recorder, and remodulation sequentially, the
monitor obtains an estimated version of the original message,
denoted as Iˆo. If the capability of correcting errors provided by
the modulation and the channel coding together is larger than
the total errors introduced by an SPC process, we assume that
Iˆo = Io. This assumption holds in practical situations since
the errors introduced by an SPC process is relatively small as
compared with a DPC process. In other words, a reliable anti-
copying 2D barcode should provide an error-free bit sequence
for the original message in an SPC process.
In our approach, the monitor performs a threshold test using
the following hypotheses for detecting the presence of the
hidden information, given as
H0 : Yˆ1 without containing Ih
H1 : Yˆ1 with containing Ih . (4)
Thus, the equalization output under two hypotheses can be
respectively expressed as
Yˆ1 |H0 = Io ⊕ e1, (5)
Yˆ1 |H1 = I ⊕ e1. (6)
Based on (4), we propose two hidden information detection
schemes at anti-copying 2D barcodes by comparing the gray
value of each pixel in Yˆ1 and that in Iˆo. For example, the
monitor constructs a test statistic δ and then makes a detection
decision ϕm on δ according to
ϕm =
{
0, δ < θm
1, δ ≥ θm , (7)
where θm is the test threshold using the hypotheses defined in
(4). Here, ϕm = 1 represents the hypothesis H1 in (4) while
ϕm = 0 represents the opposite hypothesis. The optimal value
of θm is determined by εPFA according to the NP theorem,
where εPFA is the upper bound of the PFA allowed by the
monitor.
1) Pixel Distance Based Detection (PDBD) Scheme: The
first scheme is to directly use the pixel distance to detect the
use of an information hiding scheme in a 2D barcode, referred
as to the Pixel Distance Based Detection (PDBD) scheme. In
the PDBD scheme, the test statistic is denoted as
δ =
Nd∑
i=1
∣∣∣Iˆo (i)− Yˆ1 (i)∣∣∣, (8)
where Nd is the total number of pixels in a received 2D
barcode. Here, Iˆo (i) and Yˆ1 (i) represent the ith gray value
of each pixel in Iˆo and Yˆ1, respectively.
For different hypotheses defined in (4), the test statistic in
(8) can be respectively expressed by
δ|H0 =
Nd∑
i=1
|Io (i)− (Io (i)⊕ e1 (i))|, (9)
δ|H1 =
Nd∑
i=1
|Io (i)− (I (i)⊕ e1 (i))|, (10)
where Io (i), I (i), and e1 (i) represent the ith gray value of
each pixel in Io, I , and e1, respectively.
2) Pixel Variance Based Detection (PVBD) Scheme: The
second scheme is first to calculate the variance of Yˆ1 and the
covariance between Iˆo and Yˆ1, and then based on the variance
results, detects the use of an information hiding scheme in a
2D barcode, referred as to the Pixel Variance Based Detection
(PVBD) scheme. In the PVBD scheme, the test statistic is
denoted as
δ = 1−
cov
(
Iˆo, Yˆ1
)
var
(
Yˆ1
) , (11)
where var
(
Yˆ1
)
and cov
(
Iˆo, Yˆ1
)
represent the sample vari-
ance of Yˆ1 and the sample covariance between Iˆo and Yˆ1,
expressed as
var
(
Yˆ1
)
=
1
Nd
Nd∑
i=1
(
Yˆ1 (i)− 1
Nd
Nd∑
i=1
Yˆ1 (i)
)2
, (12)
cov
(
Iˆo, Yˆ1
)
=
1
Nd
Nd∑
i=1
(
Iˆ0 (i) Yˆ1 (i)
)
− 1
Nd
Nd∑
i=1
Yˆ1 (i)− 1
Nd
Nd∑
i=1
Iˆ0 (i)
. (13)
The basic idea of the PVBD scheme is to utilize the fact that
the variance of Yˆ1 under different hypotheses has a significant
difference. For different hypotheses defined in (4), the test
statistic in (11) can be respectively expressed by
δ|H0 = 1−
cov (Io, Io ⊕ e1)
var (Io ⊕ e1) , (14)
δ|H1 = 1−
cov (Io, I ⊕ e1)
var (I ⊕ e1) . (15)
The PVBD scheme has a better detection performance than
the PDBD scheme because it magnifies the difference between
Io and I . In comparison, the PDBD scheme has two key ad-
vantages over the PVBD scheme. First, the PDBD scheme runs
faster than the PVBD scheme. Second, the PDBD scheme can
pinpoint the exact locations on the received 2D barcode that
are embedded with hidden information, whereas the PVBD
scheme cannot, which will be verified in the next section. In
the next subsection, we present a simplified theoretical model
for the test statistic of two proposed schemes for obtaining
their optimal test thresholds. In the last subsection, we will
present experimental results to verify the theoretical analysis
6of our approach.
B. Performance Analysis of Our Approach
Through observing the experimental results, we find that
we can use a generalized Gaussian distribution (GGD) [18] to
well describe the behavior of the test statistics of our approach,
which will be verified in Section VI.B. A GGD random
variable (RV) is denoted as x ∼ GGD (µ, σ2, γ), where µ
is the mean, σ2 is the variance, and γ is the shape factor.
According to [19], we respectively express the Probability
Distribution Function (PDF) and the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of x as
fX (x) =
γη (σ, γ)
2Γ (1/γ)
exp
[− (η (σ, γ) |x− µ|)γ], (16)
FX(x) =
1
2
+ sgn(x− µ)κ
[
1/γ, (|x− µ| η(σ, γ))γ]
2Γ(1/γ)
, (17)
where η (σ, γ) = 1σ
√
Γ(3/γ)
Γ(1/γ) , κ (·) is the lower incomplete
gamma function, Γ (·) is the gamma function, and sgn (x)
represents a symbol decision function, i.e., sgn (x) = 1, if
x ≥ 0, and sgn (x) = −1 otherwise.
According to [2], [20], we can estimate three parameters of
a GGD distribution for the test statistic of our approach from
experimental results. We assume that there are Ms samples
of δ (j), j = 1, . . . ,Ms for different hypotheses to estimate
parameters of a GGD distribution. First, the sample mean and
the sample variance are respectively obtained as
µ (δ) =
1
Ms
Ms∑
j=1
δ (j) , (18)
σ2 (δ) =
1
Ms
Ms∑
j=1
(δ (j)− µ (δ))2. (19)
Second, according to the results of [19], [21] , we construct a
generalized Gaussian ratio function r (γ (δ)), defined as
r (γ (δ)) =
σ2 (δ)(
1
Ms
Ms∑
j=1
|δ (j)− µ (δ)|
)2 = ρ, (20)
where
ρ =
Γ (1/γ (δ)) Γ (3/γ (δ))
Γ2 (2/γ (δ))
. (21)
Then, a feasible solution of γ (δ) can be found as,
γ (δ) = r−1 (ρ) , (22)
where we use an exhausted search approach for solving (22)
to obtain an estimate of γ (δ). We calculate the PFA of our
approach as
PFA = Pr
{
δ|H0 > θm
}
= 1− FX(θm). (23)
By setting PFA ≤ εPFA, we obtain the optimal value of θm as
θ0m =
κ−1
[
1
γ(δ) , (1− 2εPFA) Γ
(
1
γ(δ)
)]
η (σ (δ) , γ (δ)) γ (δ)
+µ (δ) , (24)
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Fig. 3. Comparison of histograms and theoretical results about the test statistic
of the PDBD scheme on the LCAC 2D barcode, where a camera phone is
used as the capturing device.
where κ−1 (·) is the inverse of the incomplete lower gamma
function. At last, we calculate the Probability of Detection
(PD) of our approach as
PD = Pr
{
δ|H1 > θ0m
}
=1− FX(θ0m). (25)
C. Experimental Results of Our Approach
In this subsection, we compare the experimental results of
our proposed detection schemes with their theoretical results,
where two hypotheses defined in (4) are considered. In our
experiment, we put the same 2D barcodes on an A4 paper
20 times and print it with a printer, and then scan each 2D
barcode with a scanner 50 times or with a camera phone 50
times. Thus, each 2D barcode is captured by 1000 times. We
set εPFA=0.01. The experimental settings are given as follows:
• Printer: HP LaserJet P1108 with 1200 DPI;
• Printing Material: A4 paper with weight 120 g/m2 from
the Xerox;
• Scanner: BENQ K810 scanner in 1200 DPIE;
• Camera Phone: HONOR V20 with 4800MP pixels;
• Capture Angle: Within 10 degrees between the barcode
image plane and the camera sensor plane;
• Capture Distance: About 15 cm in the in-focus case;
• Lighting: 300-350 lux for the bright case and 100-150
lux for the dim case.
Based on the description in [1] and [2], the parameters of
two existing anti-copying 2D barcodes are respectively given
as follows:
• 2LQR Code Design: A barcode with 25 × 25 modules
with actual size 1.2 × 1.2 cm2, b = 42%, and Lb=225;
Since the size of each pattern is 12×12 pixels, Nd=25×
25× 12× 12=90000 pixels;
• LCAC 2D Barcode Design: A multilevel 2D barcode with
47 × 47 modules with actual size 3.2 × 3.2 cm2; The
modulation order is 4, i.e., Q = 4 and the constellation
points are set as {40, 100, 160, 220}. Since the size of
each module is 32 × 32 pixels, Ld=2209, Nd=2209 ×
32× 32=2262016 pixels.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of histograms and theoretical results about the test statistic
of the PVBD scheme on the LCAC 2D barcode, where a camera phone is
used as the capturing device.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF THEORETICAL RESULTS, SIMULATION RESULTS AND
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF THE PD OF THE PDBD SCHEME UNDER
DIFFERENT CAPTURING DEVICES.
Anti-Copying
2D Barcode 2LQR LCAC
Capturing
Device Scanner Camera Phone Scanner Camera Phone
Theoretical 1 1 0.67 0.68
Simulation 1 1 0.67 0.68
Experimental 1 1 0.63 0.65
We first present the distribution of the test statistic of our
two schemes for the LCAC 2D barcode, as illustrated in
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, respectively, where both histograms and
theoretical results are presented. From Fig. 3 and Fig. 4,
we observe that the experimental results match well with
GGD approximations. By comparing the results of Fig. 3 and
those of Fig. 4, we observe that the PVBD scheme has much
better detection performance than the PDBD scheme since the
distribution distance between two hypotheses in the PVBD
scheme is significantly larger than that in the PDBD scheme.
This is because the operation divided by the variance of
different hypotheses in (11) magnifies the difference between
the 2D barcode carrying no hidden information Io and the
2D barcode carrying hidden information I , which verifies
the aforementioned conclusion. Moreover, since the 2LQR
code introduces visually perceptual modification, we do not
present the histograms and theoretical results of our schemes
on the 2LQR code to save the page space. In other words, the
existence of the hidden information in the 2LQR code is even
visually detectable.
For evaluating the accuracy of our theoretical analysis,
we compare the theoretical results, simulation results and
experimental results of the PD of our two schemes under
different capturing devices, as presented in Tab. I and Tab.
II, respectively, where we set εPFA=0.01. Here, the theoretical
results are calculated through (25). For obtaining the simula-
tion results, we first obtain the parameters of a GGD through
(18), (19), and (22); Second, based on these parameters,
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF THEORETICAL RESULTS, SIMULATION RESULTS AND
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF THE PD OF THE PVBD SCHEME UNDER
DIFFERENT CAPTURING DEVICES.
Anti-Copying
2D Barcode 2LQR LCAC
Capturing
Device Scanner Camera Phone Scanner Camera Phone
Theoretical 1 1 1 1
Simulation 1 1 1 1
Experimental 1 1 1 1
we generate a GGD sequence to simulate an SPC process;
Third, through the simulated SPC process, we obtain different
equalization outputs under two hypotheses; At last, we obtain
the simulation results through (7). From Tab. I and Tab. II,
we observe the following conclusions. First, the theoretical
results perfectly match the simulation results as we expected
while the theoretical results very close to the experimental
results; Second, the existence of the hidden information in
the 2LQR code is easier detected than that in the LCAC 2D
barcode; Third, the PVBD scheme has much better detection
performance than the PDBD scheme; At last, the detection
performance under the camera phone is better than that under
the scanner since the camera phone has better capturing
resolution than the scanner in our experiment setup.
V. ADVANCED IC ATTACKS
A. Our IC Attack for the 2LQR Code
To facilitate the introduction of our IC attack for the 2LQR
code, we first introduce some notations about the 2LQR code.
In the 2LQR code, each black-and-white subtle pattern consists
of Np × Np pixels and has the same black pixel density,
denoted by b. Specifically, if there are Nk black pixels in a
subtle pattern, the value of b is calculated by b=Nk/N2p . We
denote the jth patterns in Ih and Yˆ1 as Pj and Sj , respectively,
where j = 1, . . . , Lb and Lb is the total number of black
modules in a 2LQR code. We calculate the Pearson correlation
between Pj and Sj as
pcor(Pj , Sj) =
Np∑
w=1
Np∑
h=1
P¯j(w, h)S¯j(w, h)√
Np∑
w=1
Np∑
h=1
(
P¯j(w, h)
)2√ Np∑
w=1
Np∑
h=1
(
S¯j(w, h)
)2 , (26)
Here, we denote P¯j(w, h) and S¯j(w, h) as follows, respec-
tively,
P¯j(w, h) = Pj(w, h)− 1
N2p
Np∑
w=1
Np∑
h=1
Pj(w, h), (27)
S¯j(w, h) = Sj(w, h)− 1
N2p
Np∑
w=1
Np∑
h=1
Sj(w, h), (28)
where Pj(w, h) and Sj(w, h) are the gray value at the wth
row and the hth column of Pj and Sj , respectively.
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Fig. 5. Flow chart of our IC attack for the 2LQR code.
In the 2LQR code, the legitimate sender and receiver should
share a pattern database in whole or in part for making an
authentication decision. Thus, we propose two advanced IC
attacks for the 2LQR code under two scenarios: Public Pattern
Database (PPD) and Unknown Pattern Database (UPD). The
PPD scenario is possible in a practical situation because a
monitor can purchase different 2LQR codes multiple times to
recover the pattern database. Under the PPD scenario, the goal
of our IC attack is to first find the chosen patterns from the
public pattern database and then based on the chosen patterns
to launch an effective IC attack. Then, under the UPD scenario,
the design of our IC attack becomes more challenging as
compared with the PPD scenario since the pattern database
is unknown and a monitor has only one 2LQR code. Under
the UPD scenario, our IC attack first estimates the size of
a received pattern and then constructs an alternative pattern
database through a binarization technique. At last, our IC
attack finds the chosen patterns from the alternative pattern
database and then based on the chosen patterns to launch an
effective IC attack.
1) PPD Scenario: For comparing the difference between
the public pattern database and the alternative pattern database,
based on the description in [1], we first introduce the charac-
teristics of the patterns in the public pattern database. The
patterns in the public pattern database have the following
characteristics:
• They have the pixels with the same size;
• They are binary;
• They have the same black pixel density, i.e., the value of
b keeps the same for each pattern;
• They have spectra related to them.
We assume Lb received patterns, denoted as Si (i =
1, . . . , Lb), and Lm patterns in the public pattern database,
denoted as DPj (j = 1, . . . , Lm). We illustrate the flow chart
of our IC attack for the 2LQR code in Fig. 5. We introduce
the detailed processes of our approach in Algorithm 1.
2) UPD Scenario: In this scenario, although the pattern
database is unknown and only one 2LQR code is available,
the size of a received pattern is relatively easily estimated.
For example, after observed multiple received patterns with a
Algorithm 1: Our IC attack for the 2LQR code
Input: Si (i = 1, . . . , Lb);DPj (j = 1, . . . , Lm)
Output: new 2D barcode
for i = 1; i ≤ Lb do
pcori = max
j
{pcor (Si, DPj)}
Replace Si by the chosen pattern DPpcori
end
return new 2D barcode;
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Fig. 6. Flow chart of constructing an alternative pattern database for the
2LQR code.
high-resolution scanner, we look for some pixels with strict
square shapes. Based on these chosen pixels, we can estimate
the size of a pixel and then can calculate the size of a received
pattern, i.e., the ratio between the length of the received
pattern to the length of a pixel. Through multiple experiments
based on the aforementioned public pattern database, the
estimation accuracy on the size of a received pattern is perfect.
However, if we straightforwardly construct an entire pattern
database only based on the size of a received pattern, the
dimensionality of the entire pattern database becomes huge,
i.e., 2N
2
p . The dimensionality of the entire pattern database
inevitably introduces prohibitive requirements on the storage
space and the computational complexity, which hinders the
application of our approach in practice. Thus, it is a wise
option to construct an alternative pattern database, whose
dimensionality is significantly smaller than that of the entire
pattern database.
We illustrate the flow chart of constructing an alternative
pattern database for the 2LQR code in Fig. 6. Here, we de-
note two functions. First, g1 (Si, θ1) represents a binarization
function that binarizes the received pattern Si with a threshold
θ1 to obtain a binary pattern BSi. Second, g2 (BSi, θ2) is to
construct a sub-database of the alternative pattern database
DP (i) (i = 1, . . . , Lb) based on a binary pattern BSi and
a threshold θ2, where the size of the previous Lb − 1 sub-
databases is denoted by bLm/Lbc, and that of the last sub-
database patter is Lm − (Lb − 1) bLm/Lbc, and b·c is a floor
function. Specifically, we randomly modify the gray values
of some pixels in BSi to obtain a new binary pattern, e.g.,
9black pixels replaced by white pixels and vice versa. Then
we calculate the Pearson correlation between the new binary
pattern and BSi. If the value of the Pearson correlation is
no less than θ2 and the new binary pattern does not exist
in the sub-database DP (i), we put the new binary pattern
into DP (i). The above processes continue until DP (i) is
filled up. Then we finish the construction of DP (i). Now, we
introduce the detailed processes of constructing an alternative
pattern database in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Constructing an alternative pattern database
for the 2LQR code
Input: Si (i = 1, . . . , Lb);θ1;θ2
Output: alternative pattern database
for i = 1; i ≤ Lb do
Binarize Si through g1 (Si, θ1) to obtain a binary
pattern BSi ;
Construct a sub-database of the alternative pattern
database DP (i) through g2 (BSi, θ2).
end
return alternative pattern database;
B. Our IC Attack for the LCAC 2D Barcode
Based on the PDBD scheme described in Section IV, we
further propose an advanced IC attack for the LCAC 2D
barcode. Unlike the detection problem in (4), our IC attack
should pinpoint the exact locations on the received 2D barcode
that are embedded with hidden information. Thus, we perform
a threshold test using the following hypotheses for detecting
the presence of the hidden information on the current module,
given as
H0 : Current module without containing Ih
H1 : Current module with containing Ih (29)
Specifically, we construct a test statistic for the jth module
(j = 1, . . . , Ld) as
δ (j) = I¯o (j)− Y¯1 (j) , (30)
where Ld is the number of modules in the received 2D
barcode. We assume that each module consists of Np × Np
pixels in the LCAC 2D barcode. Here, I¯o (j) and Y¯1 (j) are
the average gray values of the jth module in Iˆo and Yˆ1,
respectively. By considering an SPC process, it is reasonable
to assume Iˆo = Io. Then, we make a test decision ϕa (j) on
δ according to
ϕa (j) =
{
0, δ ∈ θa
1, δ /∈ θa , (31)
where θa is the range of the test threshold using the hypotheses
defined in (29). Here, ϕa (j) = 1 represents the hypothesis H1
in (29) while ϕa (j) = 0 represents the opposite hypothesis.
The basic idea of our IC attack is derived from a funda-
mental fact, i.e., provided that the channel noise is small,
the received modules should appear around the constellation
point, as illustrated in Fig. 7, where 4-order modulation is
considered, i.e., Q = 4. In Fig. 7, the dashed lines represent the
Fig. 7. Diagram of our IC attack for the LCAC 2D barcode with 4-order
modulation.
decision boundary of demodulation in a multilevel 2D barcode.
We take one constellation point as an example to illustrate the
idea behind our IC attack for the LCAC 2D barcode, e.g., 40
is a standard constellation point in Io and it is changed to
100 in I . If the channel noise is large, there are two types of
errors to occur. The first type is the false alarm, as illustrated
by the red dots in Fig. 7, where the modules belonging to
the constellation point of 40 is mistakenly classified to the
constellation point of 100. The second type is the missed
detection, as illustrated by the yellow dots in Fig. 7, where
the modules belonging to the constellation point of 100 are
mistakenly classified to the constellation point of 40. Thus, the
optimal value of θa in (31) is also determined by making the
PFA less than a predetermined upper bound, εa,PFA, according
to the NP theorem.
If we can correctly find most of the embedded locations, we
can launch an effective IC attack. Specifically, our IC attack
first recovers the original message Io. Second, our IC attack
directly demodulates the received modules at the embedded
locations (ϕa (j) = 1) and then replaces the modules of Io
at corresponding locations (ϕa (j) = 1) by the demodulated
modules. At last, our IC attack prints it to launch an effective
IC attack. Moreover, according to the results of [2], [22],
we know the fact that the channel noises around different
constellation points have different distributions. Thus, we
propose two advanced IC attacks for the LCAC 2D barcode
under two cases: All Constellation Points (ACP) and Separate
Constellation Points (SCP). In the ACP case, the detection
on embedded locations is designed on all constellation points,
where we treat all constellation points equally. In the SCP case,
the detection on embedded locations is separately designed on
different constellation points, where we treat different constel-
lation points individually. Similar to the previous section, we
also use GGD RVs to describe the behavior of the test statistics
of our IC attacks for obtaining their optimal test thresholds,
which are introduced as follows, respectively.
1) ACP Case: We present the distribution of the test
statistic of our IC attack with the ACP case for the LCAC
2D barcode, as illustrated in Fig. 8, where both histograms
and theoretical results are presented. The experimental settings
and the parameters of the LCAC 2D barcode are the same as
those of Fig. 3 From Fig. 8, we observe that the experimental
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Fig. 8. Comparison of histograms and theoretical results about the test statistic
of our IC attack with the ACP case for the LCAC 2D barcode, where a camera
phone is used as the capturing device.
results match well with seven GGD approximations. We index
all GGD RVs as i = 1, · · · , 7 from left to right, where
the 4th GGD RV describes the behavior of δ under H0 and
the remaining GGD RVs together describe the behavior of
δ under H1. In comparison with the number of standard
constellation points, the number of GGD RVs under H1 is
large because the gray value of each constellation point after
embedded will generate three different gray values. We take
the constellation of 40 as an example. When it is embedded
by hidden information, its gray value may become to 100,
160, or 220. Correspondingly, the value of δ in (30) has three
different values: -60, -120, and -180, respectively.
Similar to (18)-(22), we obtain the parameters of each GGD
RV, i.e., the mean µi, variance σ2i , and shape factor γi . Fig. 8
shows that the PFA is generated under two situations: left and
right. Under the left situation, when we observe the distribution
from the left of the 4th GGD RV to the right, we can calculate
the PFA as
PFA l = Pr
{
δ|H0 < θa(all l)
}
= FX(θa(all l)), (32)
where θa(all l) is the left threshold. Similarly, under the right
situation, when we observe the distribution from the right of
the 4th GGD RV to the left, we can calculate the PFA as
PFA r = Pr
{
δ|H0 > θa(all r)
}
= 1− FX(θa(all r)), (33)
where θa(all r) is the right threshold. According to the NP
theorem, we have PFA l + PFA r ≤ εa,PFA. For convenience,
we assume that the PFAs under two situations are similar and
both are less than εa,PFA2 , i.e., PFA l ≤ εa,PFA2 and PFA r ≤ εa,PFA2 .
Then, we respectively obtain the optimal value of θa(all l) and
θa(all r) as
θ0a(all l) = −
κ−1
[
1
γ4
, (1− εa,PFA) Γ (1/γ4 )
]
η(σ4, γ4)γ4
+µ4, (34)
θ0a(all r) =
κ−1
[
1
γ4
, (1− εPFA) Γ (1/γ4 )
]
η(σ4, γ4)γ4
+µ4. (35)
In summary, the range of the optimal threshold in our IC attack
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Fig. 9. Comparison of histograms and theoretical results about the test statistic
of our IC attack with the SCP case for the LCAC 2D barcode under four
scenarios: (a) Constellation Point of 40; (b) Constellation Point of 100; (c)
Constellation Point of 160; (4) Constellation Point of 220, where a camera
phone is used as the capturing device.
with the ACP case is denoted as
θ0a(all) =
[
θ0a(all l), θ
0
a(all r)
]
. (36)
When the value of δ falls into θ0a(all), we accept H0 in (29)
and we set ϕa (j) = 0; otherwise, we accept H1 in (29) and
we set ϕa (j) = 1.
2) SCP Case: Since the channel noises around different
constellation points have different distributions, we present
the distribution of the test statistic of our IC attack with the
SCP case for the LCAC 2D barcode, as illustrated in Fig. 9,
where both histograms and theoretical results are presented.
The experimental settings and the parameters of the LCAC 2D
barcode are the same as those of Fig. 3. From each subfigure
of Fig. 9, we observe that the experimental results match well
with four GGD approximations. We index all GGD RVs as
i = 1, · · · , 4 from left to right. Then, similar to (18)-(22),
we obtain the parameters of each GGD RV, i.e., the mean µi,
variance σ2i , and shape factor γi . Based on the distribution of
different scenarios illustrated in each subfigure of Fig. 9, we
perform a threshold test to detect the presence of the hidden
information on the current module under different scenarios.
Similar to our IC attack with the ACP case, we derive the
optimal value of θa for our IC attack with the SCP case under
different scenarios by making PFA ≤ εa,PFA. Specifically, for
the scenario of the constellation point of 40, as illustrated in
Fig. 9(a), we obtain the range of the optimal threshold as
θ0a(40) ≥ −
κ−1
[
1
γ4
, (1− 2εa,PFA) Γ (1/γ4 )
]
η(σ4, γ4)γ4
+µ4. (37)
For the scenario of the constellation point of 100, as illustrated
in Fig. 9(b), we obtain the optimal range of θa(100 l) and
θa(100 r) as
θ0a(100 l) = −
κ−1
[
1
γ3
, (1− εa,PFA) Γ (1/γ3 )
]
η(σ3, γ3)γ3
+µ3, (38)
θ0a(100 r) =
κ−1
[
1
γ3
, (1− εa,PFA) Γ (1/γ3 )
]
η(σ3, γ3)γ3
+µ3. (39)
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Fig. 10. Equipment settings for emulating a DPC process.
Then, we obtain the range of the optimal threshold as
θ0a(100) =
[
θ0a(100 l), θ
0
a(100 r)
]
. (40)
For the scenario of the constellation point of 160, as illustrated
in Fig. 9(c), we obtain the optimal range of θa(160 l) and
θa(160 r) as
θ0a(160 l) = −
κ−1
[
1
γ2
, (1− εa,PFA) Γ (1/γ2 )
]
η(σ2, γ2)γ2
+µ2, (41)
θ0a(160 r) =
κ−1
[
1
γ2
, (1− εa,PFA) Γ (1/γ2 )
]
η(σ2, γ2)γ2
+µ2. (42)
Then, we obtain the range of the optimal threshold as
θ0a(160) =
[
θ0a(160 l), θ
0
a(160 r)
]
. (43)
For the scenario of the constellation point of 220, as illustrated
in Fig. 9(d), we obtain the range of the optimal threshold as
θ0a(220) ≤
κ−1
[
1
γ1
, (1− 2εa,PFA) Γ (1/γ1 )
]
η(σ1, γ1)γ1
+µ1. (44)
When the value of δ falls into θ0a(40), or θ
0
a(100), or θ
0
a(160),
or θ0a(220), we accept H0 in (29) and we set ϕa (j) = 0;
otherwise, we accept H1 in (29) and we set ϕa (j) = 1.
VI. EXPERIMENT RESULTS OF ADVANCED IC ATTACKS
A. Experimental Setup
Note that in both Section IV and Section V, we consider an
SPC process in the experimental results. However, since this
section emulates IC attacks for two existing anti-copying 2D
barcodes, we should consider a DPC process in the experimen-
tal results. We illustrate the equipment setting for emulating
a DPC process in Fig. 10. Specifically, first, a sender prints
a legitimate 2D barcode according to the principle defined in
existing anti-copying 2D barcodes. Second, a monitor captures
it by using the first capturing device, e.g., a scanner or a
camera phone, and then prints an illegitimate 2D barcode by
launching our advanced IC attacks. At last, a receiver captures
the illegitimate 2D barcode by using the second capturing
device, e.g., a scanner or a camera phone, and then makes
an authentication test defined in (3).
We consider two existing anti-copying 2D barcodes:
1) 2LQR code, where we set the authentication threshold
of the Pearson correlation as θb = 0.12, just like in [1];
2) LCAC 2D barcode, where we set the error correction
capability of authentication message as ta = 10 and
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF Ps OF VARIOUS IC ATTACKS FOR THE 2LQR CODE
UNDER THE PPD SCENARIO.
IC Attacks Direct Synthetic ML-Based Our
Ps 0 0 0.40 0.6538
we set the authentication threshold of the BER as θb =
1.2%, just like in [2].
Moreover, we consider five IC attacks:
1) Direct IC attack;
2) Synthetic IC attack, where 6 versions of a legitimate
2D barcode are used to synthesize an illegitimate 2D
barcode;
3) ML-based IC attack [3], where for the 2LQR code,
we use the equalization outputs of Lm leg3) ML-based
IC attack [3], where for the 2LQR code, we use the
equalization outputs of Lm legitimate 2D barcodes, i.e.,
Yˆ1, and the electronic version of Lm corresponding
legitimate 2D barcode, i.e., I , to obtain an attacking
model; Similarly, for the LCAC 2D barcode, we use the
equalization outputs of 60 legitimate 2D barcodes, and
the electronic version of 60 corresponding legitimate 2D
barcodes to obtain an attacking model.
4) Our IC attacks for the 2LQR code under the PPD and
UPD scenarios, where we set θ1 = 127 and θ2=0.8 for
the UPD scenario;
5) Our IC attack for the LCAC 2D barcode, where we set
εa,PFA = 0.01.
The experimental settings and the parameters of two existing
anti-copying 2D barcodes are the same as those given in
Section IV.C. Here we consider two performance metrics:
1) The first metric is the probability of successfully attack-
ing, which is defined as
Ps=
Ma
Mr
, (45)
where Mr is the number of received illegitimate 2D bar-
codes and Ma is the number of illegitimate 2D barcodes
mistakenly accepted by the receiver as legitimate ones;
2) The second metric is the probability of correctly pin-
pointing the embedded locations in the LCAC 2D bar-
code, which is defined as
Pr=
Lc
Lh
. (46)
We define Ch as the set of actual embedded locations
in hidden information and Lh is the corresponding set
length. We define Ce as the set of estimated embedded
locations, Cc is the intersection set of Ce and Ch, i.e.,
Cc = Ce
⋂ Ch, Lc is the set length of Cc.
B. Experimental Results for the 2LQR Code
We present the experimental results for the 2LQR Code
under the PPD and UPD scenarios, respectively, where we
use a scanner as both the first and second capturing devices.
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TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF Ps OF OUR IC ATTACK VERSUS DIFFERENT Lm FOR THE
2LQR CODE UNDER THE PPD SCENARIO.
Lm 100 1000 10000
Ps 0.6538 0.6226 0.5637
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF Ps OF VARIOUS IC ATTACKS FOR THE 2LQR CODE
UNDER THE UPD SCENARIO.
IC Attacks Direct Synthetic ML-Based Our
Ps 0 0 0.281 0.294
1) PPD Scenario: We first compare the values of Ps of
various IC attacks for the 2LQR code under the PPD scenario,
as presented in Tab. III, where we set Lm=100. From Tab.
III, we observe that our IC attack has the best performance
but both the direct and synthetic IC attacks have the poorest
performance. Although the ML-based IC attack requires a
training stage, its performance is inferior to our IC attack since
the output patterns of the ML-based IC attack may not be
exactly the same as those used in the 2LQR code.
Now, we investigate the impact of Lm on the performance
of our IC attack under the PPD scenario, as presented in
Tab. IV, where we use the same experimental settings of Tab.
III except different Lm. From Tab. IV, we observe that the
performance of our IC attack declines as the value of Lm
increasing. This is because, given the size of a pattern, the
distance between different patterns reduces as the value of
Lm increasing, which lowers the discriminability of the way
of comparing the Pearson correlation.
2) UPD Scenario: We first compare the values of Ps of
various IC attacks for the 2LQR code under the UPD scenario,
as presented in Tab. V, where we use the same experimental
settings of Tab. III except that the public pattern database is
replaced by an alternative pattern database. The ML-based IC
attack straightforwardly uses the alternative pattern database
to train an attacking model. By comparing the results of Tab.
III with those of Tab. V, we observe that the performances
of all IC attacks become worse since the patterns used in the
2LQR code may not exist in the alternative pattern database.
Moreover, from Tab. V, we can obtain the same conclusions
of Tab. III because of the same reasons. Specifically, our IC
attack has the best performance, the ML-based IC attack is
the second, and both the direct and synthetic IC attacks have
the poorest performance.
Now, we investigate the impact of Lm on the performance
of our IC attack under the UPD scenario, as presented in
Tab. VI, where we use the same experimental settings of Tab.
IV except that the public pattern database is replaced by an
TABLE VI
COMPARISON OF Ps OF OUR IC ATTACK VERSUS DIFFERENT Lm FOR THE
2LQR CODE UNDER THE UPD SCENARIO.
Lm 100 1000 10000
Ps 0.294 0.309 0.325
TABLE VII
COMPARISON OF Pr OF OUR IC ATTACKS FOR THE LCAC 2D BARCODE
UNDER THE ACP AND SCP CASES.
First Capturing Devices Scanner Camera Phone
Cases ACP SCP ACP SCP
Pr 0.9701 0.9830 0.9725 0.9852
TABLE VIII
COMPARISON OF Ps OF VARIOUS IC ATTACKS FOR THE LCAC 2D
BARCODE UNDER THE ACP AND SCP CASES WITH DIFFERENT ta .
ta 10 8
Second Capturing
Device Scanner
Camera
Phone Scanner
Camera
Phone
Direct 0.0909 0.1102 0.0872 0.1023
Synthetic 0.8051 0.8549 0.7835 0.8325
Our (ACP) 1 1 0.9732 0.98
Our (SCP) 1 1 1 1
alternative pattern database. By comparing the results of Tab.
IV with those of Tab. VI, we observe that the performances
of all IC attacks become worse because of the same reasons
of Tab. V. Moreover, from Tab. VI, we observe an opposite
conclusion of Tab. IV. Specifically, the performance of our
IC attack improves as the value of Lm increasing. This is
because the probability of the patterns used in the 2LQR code
occurring in the alternative pattern database increases as the
value of Lm increasing.
C. Experimental Results for the LCAC 2D Barcode
We first compare the values of Pr of our IC attacks for the
LCAC 2D barcode under the ACP and SCP cases, as presented
in Tab. VII, where we use both a scanner and a camera phone
as the first capturing devices and we set εa,PFA = 0.01. From
Tab. VII, we observe that our IC attack with the SCP case has
better pinpointing accuracy than that of our IC attack with
the ACP case. Moreover, the pinpointing accuracy under the
camera phone is better than that under the scanner since the
camera phone has better-capturing resolution than the scanner
in our experimental setup.
Now we compare the values of Ps of various IC attacks for
the LCAC 2D barcode under the ACP and SCP cases with
different ta, as presented in Tab. VIII, where we use the same
experimental settings of Tab. VII except that we use a scanner
as the first capturing devices, and use both a scanner and a
camera phone as the second capturing devices. From Tab. VIII,
we observe the following conclusions. First, when ta = 10,
our IC attacks under both the ACP and SCP cases have the best
performance, the synthetic IC attack is the second one, and the
direct IC attack is the last one. Second, when the value of ta
reduces, i.e., the error correction capability of authentication
message in the LCAC 2D barcode declines, the performance
of all IC attacks declines except our IC attack under the SCP
case, which highlights the advantage of our IC attack under the
SCP case. Third, the attacking performance of all IC attacks
under the camera phone is better than that under the scanner
since the camera phone has better-capturing resolution than
the scanner in our experimental setup.
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TABLE IX
COMPARISON OF Ps OF VARIOUS IC ATTACKS FOR BOTH THE 2LQR CODE
AND THE LCAC 2D BARCODE.
2D Barcode 2LQR Code LCAC 2D Barcode (Q = 2)
Second Capturing
Device Scanner
Camera
Phone Scanner
Camera
Phone
Direct 0 - 0.9630 0.9850
Synthetic 0 - 1 1
ML Based 0.40 - 1 1
Our 0.6538 - 1 1
D. Discussion
Since the ML-based IC attack [3] was designed for standard
2D barcode, i.e., Q = 2, we did not present the corresponding
experimental results in Tab. VIII. For fairly comparing the
performance of various IC attacks on both the 2LQR code
and the LCAC 2D barcode, we extend the LCAC 2D barcode
to the scenario of Q = 2, where we set ta = 1, just like in
[2]. We present the experimental results in Tab. IX, where the
PPD scenario is considered and Lm=100 for the 2LQR code,
the SCP case is considered for the LCAC 2D barcode, and the
remaining experimental settings are the same as those of Tab.
VIII. From Tab. IX, we observe the following conclusions.
First, our IC attack has the same attacking performance as
that of the ML-based IC attack for the LCAC 2D barcode
whereas our IC attack has better attacking performance as
that of the ML-based IC attack for the 2LQR code. Second,
the performance of all IC attacks improves at the modulation
order reducing for the LCAC 2D barcode as compared with the
results of Tab. VIII. Third, our IC attack has better attacking
performance for the LCAC 2D barcode than that for the
2LQR code, however, the 2LQR code cannot be applied to
the scenario of a camera phone since the 2LQR code requires
higher stability of the capturing equipment.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed two hidden information detec-
tion schemes at the existing anti-copying 2D barcodes. We
explicitly analyzed the PD and PFA of our schemes, derived
their closed-form expressions, and obtained their optimal test
thresholds. Besides we provided the experimental results of
our detection schemes under different capturing devices, we
verified the above theoretical results with simulation results.
Moreover, we designed advanced IC attacks to evaluate the
security of two existing anti-copying 2D barcodes. Note that
our IC attacks can deal with the scenario of an unknown
pattern database in the 2LQR code and can correctly pinpoint
the embedded locations in the LCAC 2D barcode. We imple-
mented our IC attacks and conducted extensive performance
comparison between our schemes and prior schemes under
different capturing devices. Interesting future research is to
detect the existence of the hidden information in a printed
2D barcode when a monitor does not know the parameters of
modulation and channel coding of the original message, which
becomes more challenging.
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